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Employer Demand for Welfare 
Recipients and the Business Cycle
Evidence from Recent Employer Surveys
Harry J. Holzer 
Michigan State University
The extent to which the business cycle affects the labor market for 
welfare recipients has recently become an issue of major concern. A 
number of studies have tried to estimate the effect of the business cycle 
or local labor market conditions on welfare caseloads over the 1980s 
and 1990s (e.g., Hoynes 1996; Wallace and Blank 1999; Ziliak and 
Figlio 1999), but less evidence has been brought to bear directly on the 
question of how recipients' labor market outcomes are (or will be) 
affected. Ultimately, the labor market performance of welfare recipi 
ents should be our primary concern, since most welfare programs are 
now being viewed as transitional assistance for those who need help 
getting into the market rather than as permanent income support for 
those who are disengaged.
It is, of course, well-known that minorities and less-educated 
workers face relatively improved employment prospects in tighter 
labor markets (e.g., Freeman 1991; Bound and Holzer 1996), but we 
cannot necessarily infer from these studies the magnitudes of the wage 
or employment declines that welfare recipients will experience over 
the next cycle. What has been observed over the cycle for other disad- 
vantaged groups might differ considerably from what welfare recipi 
ents will experience. Even among the recipients themselves, the 
declines in demand should vary according to their own personal char 
acteristics and work histories.
Direct evidence on the labor market experiences of welfare recipi 
ents to date is quite limited (e.g., Burtless 1995; Pavetti 1997), and 
offers little insight into changes over the business cycle. Furthermore, 
earlier evidence on welfare recipients reflects those who "self-
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selected" into the labor market under a very different set of rules and 
incentives than the ones which current and future recipients will face, 
rendering the earlier evidence much less useful. 1 Recent efforts to ana 
lyze labor market changes for low-income or single mothers, many of 
whom may have been on welfare, are too indirect or reflect too many 
simultaneous labor market changes to be able to sort out cyclical from 
other causes. 2 And very little of the work to date considers the extent 
to which policy instruments might influence the demand for welfare 
recipients, or their earnings and employment, over the cycle.
In this paper, I hope to address some of these issues by analyzing 
recent data from employer surveys on the labor market demand for 
welfare recipients under a variety of conditions. My earlier work on 
employers (Holzer 1996, 1998b; Holzer and Danziger 1998) focused 
on how employer skill needs, geographic locations, recruiting/screen 
ing behavior, and attitudes influence the employment opportunities of 
minorities and disadvantaged workers more generally. But these 
efforts did not deal explicitly with demand for welfare recipients or 
how recipients might be affected by the business cycle. Likewise, 
some other recent surveys of employers deal with issues of skill needs, 
training, work organization, etc., and how these affect worker compen 
sation and establishment productivity (e.g., Department of Employ 
ment, City of New York 1994; Osterman 1994; Cappelli 1996; Black 
and Lynch 1997), but they provide little evidence on disadvantaged 
workers or effects of the cycle and aggregate demand. 3
Therefore, in this paper I focus on data from a new survey of 
employers that I administered in Michigan during the fall of 1997. The 
data focus specifically on the hiring of welfare recipients and include 
several measures of establishment-level labor demand (such as the job 
vacancy rate) that reflect the business cycle. I provide estimates of how 
these measures of demand affect the willingness of employers to hire 
welfare recipients and I use them to infer how their employment is 
likely to change over the cycle. The effects of certain policy measures, 
such as the activities of labor market intermediaries or employment 
subsidies/tax credits for welfare recipients, and how these effects might 
also vary over the cycle can be inferred from these data as well.
While I draw some very limited inferences about changes in the 
demand for disadvantaged workers over the cycle from comparisons of 
different surveys over time, the estimates presented below (and the
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resulting predictions regarding business cycle effects) are from a single 
cross-section of establishments.4 While this procedure seems to gener 
ate quite plausible estimates of business cycle effects, some potential 
biases from using cross-sectional estimates to infer these effects over 
time are acknowledged and discussed below. I also analyze the self- 
reported willingness of employers to hire welfare recipients currently 
or in the future, as well as their having done so in the recent past. 
Thus, both prospective and actual employer demands for welfare recip 
ients are considered here.
In the following sections of this paper, I describe the new employer 
data, particularly those presented below, in somewhat greater detail; 
present the empirical results; and then present the conclusions and 
some discussion of policy implications.
THE NEW EMPLOYER DATA
In the fall of 1997,1 administered a new telephone survey to 900 
establishments located in three metropolitan areas of Michigan: 
Detroit, Flint, and Grand Rapids. The survey was administered to the 
individual at each establishment who was responsible for entry-level 
hiring and to all establishments that had hired someone within the past 
two years. The response rate to the survey was over 70 percent.
The questions on the survey gauged a wide range of establishment 
characteristics, especially regarding their workforces. For instance, 
questions were included on the numbers of jobs in the establishment 
that require very few cognitive skills or credentials, overall hiring and 
employment growth rates, numbers of current job vacancies, and any 
difficulties they have recently had finding qualified workers (all dis 
cussed in greater detail below). A series of questions was also asked 
about the last worker hired into a job that didn't require a college 
degree.
Regarding welfare recipients, respondents were asked whether or 
not they had hired anyone in the previous two years who had been a 
welfare recipient; if so, they were asked a series of questions about the 
job filled and the workers' characteristics and performance. The 
respondent was asked whether or not they have had any contact with an
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agency trying to place welfare recipients, particularly a "Michigan 
Works!" agency; if so, they were asked whether or not they had hired 
any referrals from these agencies. 5 Finally, a series of questions was 
asked about their prospective willingness to hire welfare recipients, 
even if they had no high school diploma or recent work experience, 
either currently or over the next year. 6 If respondents indicated that 
they were willing to hire some, they were asked how many. These 
were converted into percentages of the total number of current jobs in 
each establishment (either filled or vacant) that were potentially avail 
able to unskilled welfare recipients. A series of questions was then 
asked about the chracteristics of the jobs most likely to be filled that 
way, about whether or not the employer would provide supports (such 
as training, child care, or transportation), and whether or not govern 
ment policies (such as subsidies/tax credits or technical assistance) 
would make them any more likely to do so.
Below we provide summary data on these measures of potential 
job availability to welfare recipients, based on actual past hiring as 
well as prospective willingness to do so in the future. Summary mea 
sures are also provided on some measures of labor market tightness at 
the establishment level and of their employment of very unskilled 
workers. The extent to which these latter characteristics of establish 
ments help to account for the observed availability of employment are 
then explored through a series of regressions that are described below.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Summary Findings
Table 1 contains data on the demand for welfare recipients at the 
establishment level. We present three measures of both actual and 
prospective demand for recipients: whether or not a welfare recipient 
has been hired at some point during the previous two years; whether 
the establishment would do so either now or over the next year; and, if 
so, how many they would hire in each case. Results are presented for 
all establishments; for three large industry groups (manufacturing, 
retail trade and service industries); for four establishment size catego-
Table 1 Demand for Welfare Recipients in 1997: Summary Results (%)
By industry By establishment size By location
Demand measure All_________________________Mfga RTb Service 1-20 21-50 51-100 101+ CCC Subd
Percent of jobs in which welfare 
recipients could be hired
Currently 
Over next year
Percent of establishments that 























a Mfg = manufacturing 
b RT = retail trade 
c CC = central city 
d Sub = suburb
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ries (1-20, 21-50, 51-100, and over 100); and by location within the 
metropolitan area, i.e., central city versus suburbs. 7
Employers report that they would be willing to fill over 3 percent of 
the jobs in their establishments with welfare recipients currently, and 
over 9 percent of the course of the next year. Also, over 40 percent of 
employers indicate that they have hired someone over the past two 
years whom they believe to be a welfare recipient. 8 By all three mea 
sures, demand seems highest in retail trade and lowest in manufactur 
ing. 9
The results in Table 1 also indicate some variation among estab 
lishments in their demand for welfare recipients by industry and estab 
lishment size. Establishments that are very small (20 or fewer 
employees) have much higher demand for recipients in percentage 
terms than do larger establishments. 10 Finally, demand for recipients 
seems a bit higher among establishments located in the suburbs than 
the central city, though this is not consistently true among metropolitan 
areas."
Relative to the total number of welfare recipients who are pro 
jected to enter the labor force over the next few years (e.g., McMurrer, 
Sawhill, and Lerman 1997), these data suggest a fairly high degree of 
job availability. This is consistent with other evidence that the employ 
ment of welfare recipients to date (and single mothers more generally) 
has improved markedly since welfare reform legislation was imple 
mented at the state and federal levels during the 1990s (e.g., Bishop 
1998).
On the other hand, there are some reasons to be cautious about our 
interpretation of these numbers. The first two measures presented 
clearly represent prospective rather than actual demand and are based 
on subjective responses to hypothetical questions; these variables 
might therefore be measured with considerable error. Some employers 
might consider it more socially acceptable to answer such questions 
affirmatively, implying an upward bias in average estimates of such 
demand. And even our measure of the actual hiring of recipients in the 
recent past might be quite imperfect if employers are uncertain about 
who really has or has not been on welfare. On the other hand, the fact 
that the actual and prospective measures are correlated fairly highly 
with each other and with the establishment characteristics listed in
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Table 1 gives us somewhat greater confidence that they are meaningful 
measures, with reasonably high ratios of signal to noise. 12
Even if employer responses are accurate, competition for available 
job slots from other groups of unskilled workers would limit the actual 
availability of jobs for welfare recipients (Holzer and Danziger 1998). 
Given that most establishments and jobs are currently located in the 
suburbs, while long-term welfare recipients are disproportionately 
found in the poorest neighborhoods of central cities, the data suggest 
some potential mismatch between the locations of welfare recipients 
and the employers who would hire them; gaps between expected and 
actual skill levels and work performance are likely to materialize as 
well. 13 Thus, the extent to which these potential employment opportu 
nities for welfare recipients will become realized remains uncertain.
Summary statistics on some likely determinants of employer 
demand for welfare recipients appear in Table 2, including measures of 
the extent to which establishments experience tight labor markets and 
unmet demand for labor. These measures include the current job 
vacancy rate for the etablishment (defined as the number of current 
vacancies divided by the total number of jobs, both filled and vacant); 
the percentage of establishments that have hired workers in the past 
two years with lower-than-usual qualifications and the percentage of 
all jobs filled by such workers; and the ease with which qualified appli 
cants can currently be found to fill vacant jobs—in other words, 
whether it is very easy, somewhat difficult, or very difficult to do so. 
Also presented are measures of establishment-wide relative demand 
for unskilled labor.
By our measure, roughly 6 percent of jobs in these establishments 
are currently vacant, while unemployment rates in Michigan during 
this period have averaged just 3^ percent. Even allowing for the fact 
that our measure of job vacancies differs slightly from those generally 
used in the past, this is an extremely high vacancy rate on jobs. 14 This 
portrait of a very tight labor market is confirmed by the other measures 
of market tightness, which show that over 40 percent of establishments 
have hired workers with lower-than-usual qualifications in the past two 
years; these workers account for about 7 percent of all filled jobs in 
these establishments. Also, we find that roughly 80 percent of estab 
lishments report some current difficulty finding qualified applicants, 
with almost 40 percent reporting great difficulty.
Table 2 Labor Market Tightness and Employment of Unskilled Workers in 1997: Summary Results (%)
By industry
Demand measure
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Also no reading, 12.5 14.3 15.9 10.3 12.8 11.6 11.8 13.3 12.7 12.5
writing, or
arithmetic
Also filled by 6.2 5.9 8.7 6.2 5.7 5.5 6.1 7.0 6.6 5.9 
women
a Mfg = manufacturing 
b RT = retail trade 
c CC = central city 
d Sub = suburb
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The data in Table 2 also indicate that 37 percent of currently filled 
jobs do not require workers with any particular levels of education or 
experience. Roughly a third of these also require no reading, writing, 
or arithmetic on a daily basis, and roughly half of the latter (or about 6 
percent of jobs overall) are filled by women. Since these data refer to 
all current employment in these establishments (rather than the most 
recently filled jobs there) and since demand for skills among employ 
ers appear to be rising over time, these data appear to considerably 
overstate the current demand for unskilled workers in these establish 
ments. 15
By industry, small and/or retail trade establishments have the high 
est vacancy rates, the greatest difficulty finding qualified workers, and 
the lowest skill requirements for current employees. The difficulties 
that small establishments have finding qualified applicants, despite 
their relatively low formal skill requirements, reflect the smaller pool 
of applicants that they appear to draw, and perhaps their relatively 
greater use of informal hiring procedures as well (Holzer, Katz, and 
Krueger 1991; Holzer 1998a). All of these findings are also consistent 
with the relatively greater demand for welfare recipients, both actual 
and prospective, that we observe for these establishments in Table 1.
On the other hand, Table 2 indicates more mixed results for the 
manufacturing sector: vacancy rates are below average, but employers 
in that sector are experiencing somewhat greater difficulty finding 
qualified applicants than are other sectors. Somewhat mixed results 
are also found regarding relative demand for unskilled workers in man 
ufacturing compared with the other sectors: the percentages of all 
employees in jobs that require no credentials or cognitive skills are 
somewhat high, but relatively few of these workers are women. These 
data, along with their relatively low implied demand for welfare recipi 
ents, suggest a rapid growth in skill demand among recent hires in 
manufacturing (Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994). The data also 
indicate comparable or slightly higher levels of unmet demand in the 
suburbs than the cities, with relatively comparable demands for 
unskilled workers there.
Overall, these data imply very tight labor markets in Michigan 
with significant current demand for unskilled labor, particularly in 
small establishments and in the retail trade sector.
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Regression Results: Determinants of Demand for 
Welfare Recipients
Comparisons among industries and establishment size categories 
in Table 2 suggest that the very tight labor markets that we have 
recently experienced in Michigan help to account for at least some of 
the employer demand for welfare recipients that we observe in Table 1. 
The estimates presented in this section test this idea more formally.
In Table 3, we present results of estimated regression equations in 
which the dependent variable is the percentage of jobs that are cur 
rently available to welfare recipients in each establishment. The sub 
jective nature of this variable, and any resulting measurement error, 
generally implies inefficient but consistent estimates when it is used as 
a dependent variable. 16 Independent variables include the current job 
vacancy rate at the establishment; the percentage of jobs that do not 
require education or previous training; and dummies for establishment 
size, industry, and location. 17
The vacancy rate alone is used to capture the effects of labor mar 
ket tightness on the establishment in these equations. The current 
vacancy rate should capture both the frequency with which firms have 
new vacancies as well as their average duration. The former should be 
a function of gross hiring activity at the establishment, reflecting both 
turnover and net employment growth, as well as the percentage of hires 
at each establishment that are at least temporarily vacant before they 
are filled. The duration of any given vacancy should then depend on 
the relative supply of applicants and their quality, as well as the costs 
of recruiting and screening them. 18 While at least some of these deter 
minants of vacancy rates are separately measured in our data, their 
effects on demand for welfare recipients appear to be captured prima 
rily by the vacancy rate, which therefore appears exclusively in these 
equations. 19 Likewise, the relative demand for unskilled labor at an 
establishment appears to be fully captured by the percentage of jobs 
with no formal education or experience requirements. 20
Separate results are presented for the entire sample, for small 
establishments (50 or fewer employees), and for retail trade establish 
ments. Results are also presented for equations estimated by OLS and 
by tobit, where the latter functional form is used to deal with the large
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1 f-Statistics are in parentheses. Regression equations also include dummies for other one-digit industries (construction is omitted); 
MSA, central-city locations, and their interactions; and a constant term.
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numbers of zero values that are found in the dependent variable and the 
potential "censoring" that these values might imply. 21
Table 3 shows that the job vacancy rate and the percentage of 
unskilled employees currently working at an establishment have strong 
positive effect on the employers' stated willingness to hire unskilled 
welfare recipients. These estimates are significant in both the OLS and 
tobit cases, but the tobit estimates are about twice as large for the 
vacancy rate and almost five times as large for skill levels of current 
employees. Establishment size, in contrast, has a significant effect 
only in the OLS equations. Interestingly, manufacturing establish 
ments have lower demands for welfare recipients that are marginally 
significant, but the positive effect of being in retail trade disappears 
once we control for vacancy rates and skill needs. When separate 
equations are estimated for samples of small establishments or those in 
retail trade, the estimated effects of vacancy rates are larger, especially 
in the retail trade establishments.
The magnitude of the estimated coefficients for job vacancy rates 
at the establishment level imply large effects of labor market tightness 
on employer demand for welfare recipients. For instance, a 1-percent 
age-point increase in the job vacancy rate at any establishment implies 
that demand for welfare recipients will rise by 0.3-0.6 percentage 
points, and by 0.6-0.8 percentage points in the retail trade sector.
The results also imply possibly large effects of the business cycle 
on aggregate labor demand for welfare recipients. Most frequently, job 
vacancy rates during recessions average 1.2-1.3 percent (Abraham 
1983; Holzer 1989), which might be anywhere from 2.8 to 4.8 percent 
age points lower than comparably measured current rates. 22 Using our 
cross-sectional OLS estimates, the results imply declines in demand 
for welfare recipients during the next recession of 0.8-1.3 percentage 
points (i.e., 0.276 x 2.8 = 0.8), or 25-40 percent of all current demand 
for recipients. The tobit estimates imply effects roughly twice as large, 
though these are mostly relevant for the subset of establishments that 
have higher demand for welfare recipients at the outset. 23 The OLS 
estimates for the retail trade sector also imply business-cycle effects 
that are more than twice as large as those for the overall economy, rela 
tive to a starting level of demand (5.0) that is higher by 56 percent than 
the economy-wide mean (3.2; values found in Table 1).
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Of course, there is some question as to whether the estimates gen 
erated from a cross-section of data are appropriate for inferring aggre 
gate effects over time. For instance, job vacancy rates among estab 
lishments are likely to reflect relatively fixed firm-specific components 
(perhaps related most strongly to their job turnover rates) as well as 
more cyclical components. While only the latter is really relevant for 
the business cycle, our estimated effects of vacancies on employer 
demand for welfare recipients will confound the effects of both compo 
nents, and it is possible that this could generate either an upward or 
downward bias in these estimates. 24 However, the estimates generated 
here are generally unaffected by the inclusion of additional controls for 
gross hiring or turnover (for the limited number of establishments 
where these responses are provided), and the estimates are fairly con 
sistent with others that appear in the recent literature on how business 
cycle effects on employment vary by demographic group. 25 Thus, the 
estimates provided here are certainly plausible and possibly quite accu 
rate.
Table 4 presents results from similar regression equations, in 
which the dependent variables are employers' prospective willingness 
to hire recipients over the next year and whether or not the employer 
has hired any welfare recipients during the past two years. The former 
equations are again estimated by both OLS and tobit, while the latter 
are estimated by OLS (and therefore represent linear probability mod 
els). Both equations represent demand for welfare recipients that is 
measured over a somewhat longer time period, and at least the latter 
measures actual hiring (as opposed to that which could prospectively 
occur).
The specifications of these equations are identical to those of 
Table 3 except for one change: I also include the dummy variable for 
whether or not the establishment has hired any workers who are less 
qualified than usual in the past two years as an additional independent 
variable in some equations. Given that both of these dependent vari 
ables are measured over somewhat longer time frames than current 
demand for welfare recipients, a stronger case can be made for includ 
ing a measure of labor market tightness that captures the establish 
ment's experience over a comparably longer period of time. 26 But, 
given that the current vacancy rate is correlated with this measure and 
may at least partly capture its effects, I present results from three spec-
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1 f-Statistics are in parentheses. Sample sizes are 850 and 533 for the regressions on hinng in the past two years and over the next year, 
respectively. Regression equations also include dummies for other one-digit industries (construction is omitted); MS A, central-city 
locations, and their interactions; and a constant term.
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ifications of each equation: one including only the vacancy rate, one 
including only the dummy for having hired less qualified workers, and 
one including both. I also must note the greater potential for measure 
ment error in the more subjective variable for less qualified hires and 
therefore for downward biases in the estimated effects of this variable 
on demand for welfare recipients.
The results in columns 1-3 of Table 4 do not differ dramatically 
from those presented in Table 3: the estimated coefficients on the cur 
rent job vacancy rate are roughly similar to those in Table 3, the OLS 
estimate being a bit larger and the Tobit estimate somewhat smaller. 
The variable for having hired less qualified workers has positive and 
significant effects on the past hiring of welfare recipients and on pro 
spective hiring in the Tobit equations. 27 The effects of skill require 
ments of jobs and establishment size are larger here than in the earlier 
table, as are some of the industry effects.
If we assume that, in addition to the declines in vacancy rates spec 
ified above, the tendency to hire less qualified workers will also decline 
by 50-100 percent during a recession (an admittedly arbitrary assump 
tion), then the estimates in the right-most column 3 of Table 4 suggest 
that the tendency to have hired a welfare recipient over a two-year 
period will have declined by roughly 7-14 percentage points during a 
downturn. The prospective demand for welfare recipients over the next 
year will decline by 1.3-2.1 percentage points using the OLS column-3 
estimates, and 3.3-6.1 percentage points using the tobit column-3 esti 
mates.28 These predicted changes over the business cycle are larger in 
absolute magnitude than those reported earlier, but somewhat smaller 
relative to the means of these variables that appear in Table I. 29
The smaller relative effects of the cycle, along with larger effects 
of skill needs and other establishment characteristics, suggest that esti 
mates of establishment demand for recipients over a longer time period 
might approach some "equilibrium" level that is less sensitive to short- 
term cyclical conditions and more tied to underlying characteristics of 
the establishment and its workforce. Of course, our estimated effects 
of labor market tightness on the future demand for welfare recipients 
depends on the extent to which employers project current market con 
ditions into the future, while estimated effects on past hiring also 
depend on the duration over which any current market tightness has
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been experienced. These issues add to our uncertainty over how to 
interpret these results.
Still, the values in Table 4 lend further support the notion that a 
business cycle downturn will have quite significant effects on the labor 
market demand for welfare recipients. Given that the measure of 
whether or not the establishment has hired someone with lower qualifi 
cations is relatively subjective and therefore likely measured with some 
error, the predicted effects of the cycle here are likely to be downward- 
biased. Furthermore, the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 only capture the 
effects of the cycle on new hiring activity and do not reflect its likely 
effects on the retention of those previously hired as layoffs rise; these 
estimates therefore will not fully reflect the cycle's effects on the over 
all employment of welfare recipients. 30
The idea that aggregate labor market conditions affect employer 
willingness to hire less-skilled workers receives some additional sup 
port from comparisons between employer data collected in the Detroit 
metropolitan area in 1992-93 and those collected in 1997. The earlier 
data were collected just as the economy in Detroit was beginning to 
recover from the recession of the early 1990s; metropolitan-wide 
unemployment rates averaged about 7 percent over the course of that 
survey. Assuming that little else has changed in the labor market over 
this relatively short time period and that establishment and job charac 
teristics in the two samples are fairly similar, comparisons between the 
two surveys should indicate the extent to which the business cycle 
affects hiring determinants and outcomes for unskilled workers.
Though still preliminary, the data suggest that employers in Detroit 
are more willing to hire workers into noncollege jobs that lack certain 
non-essential credentials, such as high school diplomas or previous 
experience, and that they are more willing to hire black (especially 
male) applicants. 31 These results confirm that, in the context of the 
much tighter labor market that characterizes Detroit in 1997, employ 
ers are more willing to hire less-credentialed or minority workers now 
than earlier in the decade, when the labor market contained a good deal 
more slack.
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Regression Results: Determinants of Workplace Supports and 
Policy Responses
If employers are more willing to hire unskilled welfare recipients 
when labor markets are very tight, it might also be true that they are 
more willing to provide higher compensation or other workplace sup 
ports for these workers when markets are tight. They also might be 
more amenable to government programs or interventions that are 
designed to create employment for welfare recipients under these cir 
cumstances.
While the data do not support the notion that compensation of 
hired welfare recipients improves with labor market tightness, the other 
hypotheses listed above receive somewhat greater support. 32 Table 5 
presents results from regressions in which the dependent variables are 
a series of dummies for whether or not the employer might be willing 
to help provide any welfare recipients whom they might hire with par 
ticular workplace supports, such as transportation, child care, or train 
ing (either basic skills or job-related). We also include regressions for 
whether employers might be more willing to provide such training to 
welfare recipients if they could receive either tax credits or technical 
assistance for doing so; whether they would be more willing to hire 
recipients if they could receive a 50 percent wage subsidy for one year; 
and whether they hired welfare recipients after having contact with a 
Michigan Works! agency (for those who, in fact, had such contact). 
These equations are estimated by OLS and have the same three specifi 
cations in each case as those presented in Table 4. 33
The means in Table 5 indicate that relatively few employers would 
help provide transportation or child care to welfare recipients, though 
much larger percentages might provide training (especially if it is job- 
related). Many employers claim that their willingness to provide the 
latter would rise if they could receive tax credits or especially technical 
assistance. 34 Roughly one-third of employers report that they would 
increase employment of welfare recipients in response to wage subsi 
dies; and a majority of the firms that had contact with a Michigan 
Works! agency did subsequently hire at least one welfare recipient. 35 
The data therefore suggest that employers might be relatively respon 
sive to a variety of policy interventions designed to raise the private 
sector employment and earnings prospects of the welfare population.
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The results of Table 5 also indicate that the degree of labor market 
tightness facing establishments influences their willingness to provide 
workplace supports and their responsiveness to several potential gov 
ernment policy interventions. For instance, those that have hired work 
ers in the past two years with lower-than-usual qualifications are more 
willing to provide each type of benefit or support and are more respon 
sive to each of these government interventions. 36 Despite the crudeness 
of the dependent variables and the likelihood of measurement error 
(and therefore downward bias) in the independent variable measuring 
market tightness, these effects are increases of from 3 to 16 percentage 
points in the probabilities of providing supports or responding to gov 
ernment programs; relative to the means presented in the first column 
of Table 5, these are not necessarily small effects.
In addition, job vacancy rates at the firm also have positive and at 
least marginally significant effects on a firm's willingness to provide 
transportation or child care and on its responsiveness to subsidies or 
agency intermediation. Together with the results for hiring less quali 
fied workers, these results imply that changes in these market tightness 
variables over the business cycle, of the magnitudes assumed earlier in 
this paper, would generate some significant differences in the provision 
of workplace supports and effectiveness of policy interventions on 
behalf of welfare recipients. For instance, the estimates imply that a 
recession would reduce the willingness of those who had contact with 
a Michigan Works! agency to hire recipients by roughly 7-9 percent 
age points (relative to the current level 0.59), and would reduce will 
ingness to hire more recipients in response to subsidies by 4-6 
percentage points (relative to its current level of 0.32). If anything, 
these estimates probably understate the effects of the cycle to a consid 
erable degree. 37
CONCLUSION
This paper presents data on employer demand for welfare recipi 
ents from a recent survey of employers in Michigan. We investigate 
the determinants of employers' willingness to hire welfare recipients 
either currently or in the future, as well as the tendency to have done so
Table 5 Determinants of Workplace Supports for Welfare Recipients and Responses to Policies
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-0.039 0.200
0.106 2.577
-0.101 0.528 0.107 2.572
0.454 2.641
0.120 3.552
0.389 2.226 0.105 3.072
1.638 2.206
0.164 1.794

























1 Specifications 1-3 correspond to those in Table 4.
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over the past two years. We focus specifically on how such demand is 
affected by establishment-level measures of labor market tightness, 
such as job vacancy rates and their recent need to have hired workers 
with lower-than-usual qualifications. We also explore the effects of 
these variables on employer willingness to provide a variety of work 
place supports to any welfare recipients whom they might hire and on 
the extent to which their hiring or training of recipients might be 
affected by subsidies and credits, technical assistance, or labor market 
intermediation by local agencies.
The results of this study can be summarized as follows:
• Self-reported employer demand for welfare recipients is cur 
rently quite high in Michigan.
• Labor markets in Michigan are currently very tight.
• The tightness of the labor market accounts for significant por 
tions of the current demand for recipients, which will likely dis 
appear during the next recession.
• Labor market tightness makes employers more willing to pro 
vide workplace supports (such as training) to recipients whom 
they hire, and the employers are also more open to potential pol 
icy interventions on their behalf.
More specifically, employers in Michigan currently experience a 
considerable degree of labor market tightness. Job vacancy rates 
appear to be higher than current unemployment rates. About 80 per 
cent of employers report at least some difficulty finding qualified appli 
cants, and about 40 percent claim that they have hired workers recently 
with lower-than-usual qualifications. Regarding employer willingness 
to hire welfare recipients, they claim that they would be willing to fill 
about 3 percent of all of their jobs (or roughly half of their job vacan 
cies) right away with recipients, even if the latter had no high school 
diploma or recent work experience, and that they would be willing to 
hire many more over the next year. Furthermore, roughly 40 percent of 
employers claim that they have already hired one or more welfare 
recipients during the past two years. On the other hand, long-term wel 
fare recipients and especially inner-city minorities might have limited 
access to many of these jobs, for a variety of reasons.
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To what extent do the hiring difficulties of employers that are 
attributable to labor market tightness affect their willingness to hire 
welfare recipients? Our measures of market tightness and of willing 
ness to hire recipients are both particularly high in certain sectors of 
the labor market, such as small establishments and the retail trade sec 
tor. Yet, even controlling for these and other observable characteristics 
of establishments, we find that those with high vacancy rates (and, to 
some extent, those that have recently hired less-qualified workers) are 
more likely to hire welfare recipients, both currently and over the next 
year.
Using these cross-sectional estimates to predict the effects of the 
aggregate business cycle on hiring lead us to predict that a recession 
would reduce the current demand for welfare recipients by 25-40 per 
cent, and longer-term hiring by somewhat greater absolute magnitudes 
(but smaller percentage ones). Estimated effects of demand conditions 
on small establishments, and especially those in retail trade, are even 
higher than those observed overall. Of course, there are potential prob 
lems with inferring aggregate time-series economic changes from a 
cross-section of data, though the biases caused here could go in either 
direction. Measurement error in our more-subjective dependent and 
independent variables likely generate inefficiency and/or downward 
biases in these estimates, which also fail to include the effects of the 
cycle on the employment of recipients through its effects on retention 
as well as hiring. Overall, the results should be interpreted as sugges 
tive rather than definitive with regards to specific magnitudes of 
effects.
The data also imply that many firms might now be responsive to a 
wide range of potential government efforts to improve the employ 
ment prospects of welfare recipients. These include placement efforts 
by intermediaries, wage subsidies or tax credits for the hiring of disad- 
vantaged recipients (provided they are "employer-friendly"), and tax 
credits or technical assistance for providing them with training. Fur 
thermore, under tight labor markets, employers appear to be more 
willing than they otherwise would be to provide certain workplace 
supports (such as transportation, child care assistance, or training) to 
welfare recipients, and to respond to the kinds of government efforts 
mentioned above.
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Overall, these results imply that the labor market difficulties of 
welfare recipients will almost certainly grow more severe during the 
next recession. There will likely be some need to provide countercycli 
cal increases in labor demand (perhaps through some version of public 
service employment), or at least to improve the safety nets that welfare 
recipients will face during that time. The fact that some of the least- 
skilled welfare recipients have not yet entered the labor market, and 
may be reaching their time limits for assistance during the next eco 
nomic downturn, renders these problems even more urgent.
Given the apparent openness of employers to policies aimed at 
improving the employment options of recipients in tight markets, and 
given that many long-term welfare recipients in inner-city will have 
limited access to available jobs (because of their poor skills, transpor 
tation or information problems, etc.), a strong case can also be made 
for funding some of these efforts right now, especially if they are 
accompanied by serious evaluation efforts. A fair amount of funding is 
potentially available during the current period of tightness, as many 
states and localities have surpluses to spend in their welfare budgets 
and are receiving "welfare-to-work" grants from the federal govern 
ment. Of course, even if these programs are successful in improving 
the current labor market prospects of recipients, the extent to which 
those who achieve some success now will be retained by employers 
during the next downturn remains unclear, though at least some persis 
tence of positive outcomes over the cycle should be expected.
This study also suggests the need for continued research on these 
issues. Data on prospective employer demand for welfare recipients 
during the next downturn is not a perfect substitute for data on actual 
demand when that downturn occurs. This is particularly true since the 
estimated effects of labor market tightness in a cross-section of firms 
might differ substantially from the effects of an aggregate downturn that 
affects all firms. Evidence on layoffs/retention (as well as on new hire 
rates) could be provided from such data, and we could also obtain data 
on the experiences of employers with the later entrants to the market, 
who are likely to be more disadvantaged than those whom we have 
observed to date. While many such experiences will be apparent from 
supply-side data on recipients and their labor market experiences, the 
data on employers can continue to provide insights on the demand-side 
factors that contribute to the outcomes we observe among these workers.
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Notes
1. This self-selection generally implies that the average employment outcomes that 
we've observed for welfare recipients to date are biased upwards, though the esti 
mated effects of labor market conditions or policy initiatives on these employment 
outcomes might not be.
2. See Eissa and Liebman (1996), Eissa and Hoynes (1998), and Bishop (1998) for 
evidence on the recent improvements in employment rates of single women. But, 
in these analyses of aggregate data over time, it is often difficult to disentangle the 
effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit, changes in Medicare coverage, welfare 
reform, and the business cycle.
3. One possible exception to this was a survey of establishments in Milwaukee, 
administered by the Employment and Training Institute of the University of Wis 
consin at Milwaukee (Employment and Training Institute 1995). They gauged the 
number of job vacancies, both overall and in specific occupations, and compared 
them with the number of unskilled, unemployed workers in the metropolitan area. 
As of the mid 1990s, the number of unemployed workers continued to exceed the 
number of vacant jobs, despite the very low unemployment rates there.
4 Another wave of the survey will be administered to the same establishments in 
Michigan during the fall of 1999. The survey is currently being administered in 
several other metropolitan areas such as Chicago, Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Los 
Angeles.
5. Michigan Works! agencies are private contractors with the various Workforce 
Development Boards established at the county level by the Michigan Jobs Com 
mission. For more detailed descriptions of their activities see Seefeldt et al. 
(1998).
6. The exact wording of these questions was as follows: "Suppose you were con 
tacted by an employment agency that was trying to place welfare recipients who 
did not have a high school diploma or any recent work experience Do you cur 
rently have any open positions that you might consider filling with these welfare 
recipients?" If yes: "How many of them would you consider employing right 
away?" For the following year: "Do you think you will have open positions dur 
ing the next year that you might consider filling with these welfare recipients?" If 
yes: "How many of them would you possibly employ at any time during the next 
year?"
7 These three industries account for almost 80% of the establishments in the survey. 
Also, "central city" refers to the city of Detroit, as well as Flint and Grand Rapids, 
but does not include other municipalities that are officially designated as "central 
cities" by the Census Bureau in these areas, such as Dearborn or Pontiac.
8. We have set missing values equal to zero for the question of whether or not 
employers had hired welfare recipients over the previous two years; these account 
for roughly 20% of the sample in this case. The wages on jobs actually filled by 
recipients, as well as those prospectively available to them, averaged between 
$6.00 and 6.50, and about two-thirds offered some type of health care coverage.
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9. Reported job availability for welfare recipients was particularly high in restau 
rants and in health care facilities and personal service establishments in the ser 
vice sector.
10. Larger establishments are more likely to have hired at least one recipient, given 
that they engage in more hiring overall, but were not as high in terms of percent 
ages of their respective workforces.
11. In Detroit, job availability for welfare recipients was actually higher in the central 
city than the suburbs, while the opposite was true in Flint and Grand Rapids.
12. The correlation between job availability currently and over the next year for wel 
fare recipients is roughly 0.6, while the correlation between availability over the 
next year and the past two years is roughly 0.3.
13. In fact, the vast majority of available jobs for welfare recipients are in relatively 
small establishments (i.e., those with 50 or fewer employees), in suburban loca 
tions that are frequently not accessible to public transit, in establishments that 
recruit unskilled workers informally, or in establishments that frequently receive 
no applications from blacks (Holzer 1998b). Thus, many potentially available 
jobs will be relatively inaccessible to poor minority residents of inner-city areas, 
who constitute large fractions of long-term welfare recipients. The basic skills 
required on many of these jobs may also put some out of the reach of long-term 
recipients with poor cognitive abilities (Pavetti 1997).
14. See, for instance, Abraham (1983) and Holzer (1989) for evidence that unemploy 
ment rates usually exceed job vacancy rates by considerable amounts at all points 
in the business cycle. The question used in this survey to gauge job vacancies 
asks about all vacant jobs that the employer is currently trying to fill, while the 
question used in other surveys has generally also stipulated that these vacancies 
be available for immediate occupancy. It seems quite unlikely that a large per 
centage of vacancies that employers are currently trying to fill would only be 
available for future occupancy, though such a restriction might reduce the current 
vacancy rate to the 4-5% range.
15. For instance, when we analyze the most recently filled job in each establishment, 
we find that employers do not require (or even strongly prefer) high school diplo 
mas, previous experience, or training in roughly 17% of these jobs, and they also 
do not require reading/writing or arithmetic in just 11%.
16. This assumes that the errors are not correlated with the independent variables of 
interest
17. Dummies for all one-digit industries are included, with construction as the omit 
ted category. Locational variables include dummies for metropolitan area, central 
city, and interactions between them.
18. See Davis, Holtiwanger, and Schuh (1996), Barron, Bishop, and Dunkelberg 
(1985), and Holzer (1994, 1996).
19. Measures of overall hiring activity or recent difficulty in finding qualified appli 
cants did not generate significant estimates in these equations after controlling for 
the job vacancy rate.
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20. The three measures of skill demand that appear in Table 1 all generated qualita 
tively similar estimates when used as independent variables in these equations.
21. The dependent variable might be censored if, for example, very weak demand 
generates "negative hiring" or layoffs of welfare recipients while measured will 
ingness to hire is zero.
22. Given the discrepancy that we noted above between traditional measures of 
vacancy rates and those presented here (note 14), we assume that current rates 
could be in the range of 4-6% if measured comparably to more traditional mea 
sures.
23. Calculations of predicted values using tobit estimates must also allow for the 
probability that individual observations were censored at the outset. The sample- 
wide predictions here do not appear to differ substantially from those generated 
using the OLS estimates.
24. The estimates will be upward-biased if the firm-specific components of job 
vacancy rates have larger effects on demand for recipients than do the more cycli 
cal components. This will be true if, for example, high-turnover firms regard wel 
fare recipients as potentially more stable sources of labor than the ones on which 
they currently draw. But it is also possible that such firms have limited costs asso 
ciated with such turnover, in which case temporarily high demand might be more 
costly and generate greater effects on their hiring behavior.
25. For instance, the figures presented in Freeman and Rodgers (1998) show that the 
employment rates of less-educated young black males (i.e., those aged 16-24 with 
12 or fewer years of education) have varied by roughly one-fourth to one-third 
over the last few business cycles. Hoynes (1998) also shows that demand for less- 
skilled females is more cyclically sensitive than that of less-skilled males. Neither 
paper focuses exclusively on high school dropouts or other unskilled workers 
whose employment experiences might be more comparable to those of welfare 
recipients.
26. Indeed, these variables had little significant effect in any of the estimated equa 
tions for current willingness to hire welfare recipients but had more effect in equa 
tions for past or future hiring.
27. The percentage of jobs currently filled by workers with low qualifications also 
generated significant effects in the OLS version of the equation for future hiring, 
though it performed considerably less well than the dummy variable for any such 
hiring in some other equations presented below. While the continuous version of 
this variable might generally be preferred to the categorical one, it is likely that 
the former are measured with more error as well.
28. In other words, the lower end of the range of predictions was generated by using 
the lower bound changes in both independent variables, while the upper end of the 
predictions was generated using the upper bound changes in both cases.
29. For instance, the predictions from the OLS equations suggest that the probability 
of hiring any welfare recipient over a two-year period should decline by 17-33% 
in a recession, while the percentage of jobs available to recipients over the next 
year should decline by 14-22%.
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30. The percentage decline in the overall demand for labor among welfare recipients 
will thus reflect the relative magnitudes of declines in retention as well as in new 
hiring. Davis, Holtiwanger, and Schuh (1996) suggest that the former are gener 
ally more important in explaining the variation in unemployment rates over the 
business cycle, as changes in movements "into" unemployment appear to domi 
nate changes in movements "out."
31. For instance, specific experience was absolutely necessary or strongly preferred in 
56% of non-college jobs filled m 1992-93 but only in 49% in 1997, even though 
the fraction of newly filled jobs that were white collar was higher in the earlier 
period. The ratio of the percentage of new hires that are black to the percentage of 
applicants that are black rose from 0.78 to 0.85 as well.
32. The effects of vacancy rates and the hiring of less-qualified workers on wage lev 
els and provision of health benefits on jobs actually filled by welfare recipients 
and those prospectively available were generally negative but not significant, even 
after controlling for establishment characteristics such as industry, size, and loca 
tion.
33. For the first six of these dependent variables, we assign the value of 1 to both 
"yes" and "maybe" responses and the value of 0 to "no."
34. The relatively small numbers of employers who answered "maybe" to these ques 
tions are counted among the positive answers here. Missing values are excluded 
from the sample.
35. More evidence on the likely effects of wage subsidies and intermediary efforts 
appears in Holzer (1998b). The magnitudes of the reported hiring increases in 
response to hypothetical wage subsidies are generally consistent with estimates of 
labor demand elasticities for unskilled workers. But, firms often showed little 
knowledge of existing federal tax credits for hiring welfare recipients and often 
seemed unwilling to claim these credits even when they were aware of them and 
eligible to receive them. These results suggest that tax credits might be much 
more effective when provided in an "employer-friendly" fashion and when 
accompanied by significant outreach efforts, perhaps by intermediaries who han 
dle the paperwork (see also Katz 1998). While a majonty of the firms that had 
contact with an agency hired recipients, only about 17% of the total reported any 
such contact.
36. Of all of these estimates, significant levels are marginal only in the case of job- 
related training.
37. For instance, the likelihood that establishments have contact with the agency at all 
probably declines in a recession as well, especially for those cases where the con 
tact was initiated by the establishment rather than the agency.
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